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Abstract 
The Internet of Things (IoT) infrastructure is a conglomerate of electronic devices interconnected through the 
Internet, with the purpose of providing prompt and effective service to end-users. Applications running on an IoT 
infrastructure generally handle sensitive information such as a patient’s healthcare record, the position of a 
logistic vehicle, or the temperature readings obtained through wireless sensor nodes deployed in a bushland. 
The protection of such information from unlawful disclosure, tampering or modification, as well as the 
unscathed presence of IoT devices, in adversarial environments, is of prime concern. In this paper, a descriptive 
analysis of the security of standards and technologies for protecting the IoT communication channel from 
adversarial threats is provided. In addition, two paradigms for securing the IoT infrastructure, namely, common 
key based and paired key based, are proposed.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Internet-of-things (IoT) has emerged as a term to aptly describe the end-to-end platform for sustaining a device-
to-Internet-to-device communication model. These large set of electronic devices form the core of an IoT 
infrastructure, to support every day user activity for a plethora of applications. The evolution of the Internet, 
attributed primarily to advances in communication bandwidth accompanied with rapid development of diverse 
user-specific applications, has sustained a progressive march towards introduction of efficient electronic devices 
to facilitate our daily activity. These set of devices constituting an IoT architecture are tiny (can generally fit 
into a consumer’s pocket with ease), and exhibit features that help facilitate smooth and convenient 
user/business-activity on the go. Some of these devices include RFID tags, wireless sensors and mobile phones. 
Through the IoT infrastructure, end-users control applications required for: remote transmission of emails, blood 
pressure monitoring and transmission to a remote healthcare facility and remote transmission of the 
geographical position of a truck carrying goods to its destination. 
Moreover, rapid advances in processing and communication capabilities of these small devices over the last 
decade, has made communication over longer distances with imposed real-time constraints, realisable. The 
interaction of these IoT devices with legacy systems requires efficient and secure usage of the Internet 
communication infrastructure. As a result, not only can IoT devices establish and use remote communication to 
convey a status report of a particular event or activity, but can also provide end-users with a higher level of 
confidence in the privacy and authenticity of all services provided therein. The level and procedure to provide 
privacy and security to an IoT infrastructure will vary in diversity, description, as well as complexity, depending 
upon the IoT devices in use. For instance, a mobile phone connected through a 3G communication channel to 
the Internet will implement a different set of protocols for securing the channel, as opposed to a resource-
constrained RFID tag, that will invariably have a customised version of a resource-demanding secret-key 
verifier. 
In Fig. 1, the IoT infrastructure consisting of a set of heterogeneous IoT devices along with their respective 
communication channels is illustrated.  
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Figure 1.The IoT network infrastructure with an illustration of the standards/protocols used. 
 
 
SECURITY FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
 
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is defined as a collection of resource-constrained devices called sensor 
nodes reporting their individual readings in the form of sensory data to a high-performance base station 
(Masayuki et al., 2006). Under the context of the IoT infrastructure, such networks will serve several 
applications such as environmental monitoring, structural health monitoring, security, reconnaissance, and early 
warning applications. WSN nodes have an on-board processor (such as an ATMEGA 128-bit microcontroller), 
wireless communication capability (such as 802.15.4), a sensing module, and memory (around 128 KB of Flash 
and 8KB of RAM) (Rutlidge, 2008). The gateway is responsible for managing, coordinating, and scheduling 
operations of sensor nodes. Contemporary sensor nodes are capable of providing Advanced Encryption Standard 
(AES)-based encryption and decryption of the communication channel between the node and its gateway. 
Considering the limited radio range of sensor nodes, the gateway must be located within close proximity of the 
sensor nodes so as to reduce the overhead associated with wireless transmissions over longer distances.  
Some of the most common attacks against wireless sensor networks, as may also be present in other networks, 
exploit vulnerabilities that may fall under one of the four security threat categories. Eavesdropping of sensory 
data, transmitted from a sensor node to its base station is a very common threat in these networks. The purpose 
of such an activity is to unlawfully access sensitive data associated with a particular event or phenomenon in 
nature. For instance, the geophysical location of a truck carrying goods from one logistic location to another, 
upon disclosure may provide unfair advantage to competitors.  Privacy of all sensor network communication can 
be achieved through the use of a secret-key based mechanism, wherein all sensor node-base station pairs will 
possess a shared secret key.  In such a scenario, all data transmitted from a sender to the receiver needs to be 
encrypted using symmetric key encryption based on a standard algorithm such as AES, and subsequently 
decrypted at the receiver's end using the same shared key.   
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An alternative to the above scheme is to use public key cryptography, wherein each sensor node as well as the 
base station will possess a pair of keys, namely, public and private, for data encryption and decryption. Such a 
scheme will demand greater processing power to support operations such as modular exponentiation of large 
prime numbers. As a result, tiny sensor nodes will suffer from rapid consumption of battery life. Advances in 
processing technology, accompanied with the potential to harness the availability of renewable sources of 
energy such as solar power, are alleviating concerns associated with sensor battery life in contemporary times. 
The integrity of sensory data may be affected due to the presence of an adversary in close vicinity of a sensor 
network. The adversary may tamper with sensory data with the purpose of misleading information stakeholders, 
connected to a base station, in effect causing losses (possibly catastrophic in nature). For instance, a network of 
sensors deployed to monitor a bush fire, if compromised, may generate incorrect readings to deceive the base 
station, by portraying normal environmental conditions. In addition, an adversary may also inject malicious data 
into the sensor-to-base station communication channel, again with mal intentions. An effective approach 
towards verification of message origin and integrity is to use message authentication codes (MACs). A MAC is 
a hash of a simple concatenation of the message to be transmitted with a secret key shared between the sender 
and the receiver. A standard hash function such as MD-5 or SHA-1 would serve the purpose. A message is thus 
appended with the MAC, and sent to the destination, where the MAC of the received message is recomputed 
and compared with the received MAC, for verification. 
A message appended with the current time of the day or a fresh nonce (random number) before transmission, 
will also prevent a replay attack, wherein a stale message is replayed by the adversary, again to mislead 
information stakeholders, such as firefighters, awaiting advice from the base station.  
Jamming attacks (Sun et al., 2007) are launched by an adversary to incapacitate the sensor to base station 
communication channel from carrying signals. A jammer generates collisions on the communication channel in 
order to disrupt routine message communication. The purpose of such an attack is primarily sabotage, wherein 
the attacker attempts to prevent the base station from receiving actual readings from the sensor network. For 
instance, the blood pressure of a hypertensive patient may be prevented from being transmitted to the nearest 
base station, for subsequent rendering to a remote healthcare facility. A common practice in thwarting jamming 
attacks is to use random time slots for transmission of data, and random frequency hopping, so as to keep the 
attacker guessing, and to prevent it from disrupting signals. 
 
RFID TAG SECURITY 
A passive RFID tag has no processing power, but rather stores the ID of the tag in a particular format such as a 
barcode, readable by an RFID reader. Active RFID tags are battery-powered, and can read from a distance of up 
to hundred feet, and are therefore more versatile as compared to their passive counterparts. However, RFID tags 
operate at 100 Khz with on-chip RAM of 8Kbytes (Abe et al., 2006). Such limited resources are generally 
insufficient to hold and process large exponents required for public key cryptography. 
The primary concern in providing security to RFID devices is the scarcity of computational and communication 
resources available on the device. Moreover, RFID tags do not have enough on-chip real-estate to accommodate 
large numbers of logic gates, necessary for real-time computation of complex key generation/verification 
activity. For instance, a typical public key-based encryption using NtruCrypt on an RFID tag will require the 
processing capability of 3000 logic gates, and will use a large portion of the available tag battery (if it is an 
active tag), or will incur a long delay in acquiring power passively from an RFID reader. It may also be worth 
noting that an encumbered usage model of these devices will affect their marketability, and in effect cause the 
technology to lose pace of growth.    
Apart from encryption of all RFID tag data, authenticity of the tag itself is of utmost concern, to ensure 
uniqueness of user identity and thus secure access to other resources such as RFID readers. RFID tags may 
possess a unique collection of identifiers known as pseudonyms, which may be used on a rotating basis by the 
tag (Juels, 2006). An authorised tag reader, subject to a priori correspondence with the tag for exchange of 
pseudonyms, can identify these tags without much hassle. A possible malicious attack against such a scheme 
may involve the eavesdropping of RFID-to-RFID tag reader communication, over a period of time, to 
reconstruct the entire pseudonym set from a given tag, for possible reuse by the attacker, at a later stage. Data 
encryption through the use of either public-private key pairs or through symmetric keys will help counter the 
threat. However, the limit on the key lengths for due sustenance of cryptographic operations on RFID resources, 
exposes such devices to dictionary and brute-force attacks.  
 
MOBILE DEVICE SECURITY 
 
Mobile devices such as phones and personal digital assistants (PDAs) have become the present-day norm for 
information sharing and communication. The security of such devices can be categorised into two – social and 
technology-dependant. A mobile device is only as secure as the perception of its owner. Most mobile devices do 
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not have a passkey lock, and generally hold plaintext information. Such information may include private 
telephone numbers, bank account details (of less-careful users), and other personal information such as 
messages. A phone handed over heedlessly by its owner to another user, will have all its information exposed. A 
mobile device may also be utilised for providing real-time video footage of a patient in need of remote 
monitoring and health tips, to possibly recover from a health hazard. Such information is sensitive, and may also 
prove to be catastrophic to the patient, if compromised or tampered with, by an adversary. However, to preclude 
such incidents from taking place, the communication channel standards used for mobile communications such 
as the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), have 
in-built mechanisms for data encryption and device authentication.  
The GSM service provides stream cipher support for encrypting all data that is communicated between a 
subscriber and a service provider (mostly a gateway). Some of the encryption techniques such as the A5/1 
cipher of the GSM service have been hacked, using known plaintext attacks, wherein an attacker generates a 
large set of plaintext messages, and uses the encryption algorithm to encrypt these messages (Bouska and 
Drahansky, 2008). A large set of these plaintext message-ciphertext pairs will help the attacker construe the 
secret key, or to accurately guess the encryption algorithm, by mere observation of a pattern in the collected 
data. 
 
BLUETOOTH SECURITY 
 
Bluetooth is a wireless technology standard for facilitating exchange of data over short distances. Bluetooth 
technology provides for security at the link layer, to support key management, user authentication, and data 
encryption (Yan et al., 2008). For any two Bluetooth-enabled devices to communicate securely, a pairing 
procedure is carried out before actual communication begins. Earlier versions of Bluetooth (< v2.1) required 
each device to enter the same PIN code on a device keypad, to successfully establish a connection. These 
devices were therefore hardcoded with fixed PINs such as ‘1234’ to establish an inter-device connection without 
user intervention. Devices enabled with Bluetooth v2.1 and above use the Secure Simple Pairing (SSP) 
procedure, which is secured through PKI. One of four pairing procedures may be used for this purpose: a) 
Security mode 1, as such no user interaction is enforced, and a device automatically generates a PIN based on 
factory-level specifications, and establishes communication with another Bluetooth device in the vicinity. Head-
sets are generally reliant on this mode, b) Security mode 2, a numeric comparison of PIN codes entered by the 
users on the keypads of two devices that wish to communicate with each other, is performed, to establish a 
connection, c) Security mode 3, a device generates a PIN and transmits it securely to a second device, for 
display to the user, whereupon the user punches the same PIN onto a Bluetooth keypad for accomplishing 
mutual authentication, and d) Security mode 4, considered to be more secure than the other three approaches, 
uses a side-channel of communication (Near Field Communication) to exchange aspects of a secret (shared in 
this case), that is subsequently used by both devices for establishing a secure communication channel. All data 
communication post establishment of a connection is secured using public key cryptography. 
Security mode 1 of Bluetooth does not provide protection against a man-in-the-middle attack, where an attacker 
can guise as user A and attempt to establish a connection by replaying a captured message (containing the 
encrypted PIN), directed from user A to user B, and thereupon hijacking all communication intended from user 
B to user A, without being traced. The ability of a security mode to ensure mutual authentication is therefore 
mandatory in ensuring the security of the Bluetooth communication protocol. The applications of Bluetooth in 
the context of the IoT infrastructure are in abundance primarily because of its convenient usage and minimal 
user intervention. For example, a travelling patient with a history of diabetes can have his or her blood sugar 
level tested using a Bluetooth-enabled mobile device, which can transmit the readings to a mobile reader at any 
healthcare checkup point at airports, train stations or even inside airplanes. Further communication of the 
readings from the device reader to a remote healthcare facility can be initiated upon a simple and automatic 
analysis of the readings by the device reader. 
 
WI-FI SECURITY 
 
While Bluetooth technology is intended for mobile devices and their interconnectivity, Wi-Fi is intended for 
establishing wireless local area networks on a larger scale, and provides users with on-the-fly connection to the 
Internet, through a device called the hotspot. Wi-Fi uses the Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA and WPA2) 
standards to provide security to all communication channels. By default, Wi-Fi operates in an encryption-free 
mode (Lehembre, 2006). Therefore, unless an application service provider such as an online-banking server 
provides a secure communication channel (using HTTPS), it is not recommended to communicate passwords 
and other sensitive information through a Wi-Fi connection (as is also a rule of thumb for regular wired 
networks). Once enabled, WPA protects the Wi-Fi communication channel by generating a new key to protect 
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each data packet transmitted from a device to the hotspot. The protocol generates keys based on passphrases 
entered by the user, for providing data encryption, message authentication code generation and verification, and 
mutual authentication. It may thus be noted that the security of the communication channel is very much 
dependant on the level of complexity of the passphrase chosen by a user. A simple passphrase may lead to a 
convenient compromise by an attacker, to launch attacks such as data capture, message replay, and data 
modification/erasure.  
The Wi-Fi standard provides a very comfortable in-house network for a user to access the Internet. Wi-Fi 
hotspots are also available inside airplanes and at most airports and borders. A handicapped patient can remotely 
access the Internet from the comfort of his or her bed using a Wi-Fi connection. A device such as a sensor or an 
RFID tag connected to the patient’s body, can transmit a reading securely to a Wi-Fi hotspot, for subsequent 
relay of the digitised record of the patient’s readings to a remote healthcare facility. As a result, necessary 
support can be rendered if needed, or the patient may be advised on the dosage of medication to be taken, in a 
timely manner. 
 
PARADIGMS FOR PROVISIONING SECURITY IN AN IOT INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
A proposed paradigm for provisioning IoT security is to delegate all security-related operations to resource-rich 
Internet gateways and IoT device readers. The gateway in effect can follow standard public key or symmetric 
key cryptography for securing the communication channel between the source and the destination network. 
However, such an approach will not provide security for the IoT device-gateway communication channel. In 
Figure 2, a simple paradigm for providing a two-step approach for securing the IoT infrastructure is proposed. 
All devices with larger sets of information processing resources available to them are referred to as facilitators 
(includes gateways, RFID readers, base stations, etc). All communication between the IoT devices and the 
facilitators is secured using a shared key K1. In particular, data is encrypted using the key Kdf, and is transmitted 
alongside a message authentication code (MAC), where a MAC is the hash of the concatenation of the message 
to be transmitted, with a secret key shared between the sender and the receiver, using a standard hash function 
such as MD-5 or SHA-1. A message is thus appended with the MAC, and sent to the destination, where the 
MAC of the received message is recomputed and compared with the received MAC, for verification of message 
integrity and for authentication of the data source. Existing protocols such as Zigbee already have in-built data 
encryption procedures to secure the IoT device to intermediate facilitator communication channel. 
A similar approach is followed to securely transmit data between the diverse facilitators through the Internet, 
albeit using a different key represented as K2. The scheme used for data encryption and integrity check will 
depend on the capabilities of the device in question. For instance, a tiny RFID tag with limited processing 
capability will use symmetric encryption and smaller length keys, as opposed to a facilitator, which can use 
public key cryptography for ensuring communication channel security.  
In Figure 3, an alternative paradigm towards securing the IoT is proposed, wherein all devices possess a distinct 
key to identify themselves in a global context, achievable only through the use of the IPv6 protocol. The IPv4 
protocol is presently used for Internet communication. With growing number of Internet users, it is foreseen that 
unique IP addresses for devices connected to the Internet will eventually exhaust. As opposed to 32-bit 
addresses used by the IPv4 protocol, the IPv6 protocol, long overdue for deployment, will have 128-bits for 
addressing, to generate a total of 3.4 x 10
38
 distinct Internet addresses (Caicedo, 2009). With the growth of the 
IoT infrastructure gathering steam, it is anticipated that unique identification of devices across the world, based 
on their IP addresses will be realisable in the near future.  
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Fig.2: A device-to-intermediary-to-device security paradigm for the IoT infrastructure. 
 
Technological gaps or vulnerabilities in the contemporary IPv4 Internet architecture will also be experienced by 
end-users of the IoT infrastructure. It is therefore mandatory for having the resilience of such networks 
leveraged in time to accommodate these large set of electronic devices, which will inevitably dominate the 
market space in the near future. Such an infrastructure will place high demands on security, to be facilitated by 
the stakeholders (service providers). Therefore, the need for providing a coherent and effective end-to-end 
security mechanism applicable at the IoT infrastructure level, by mutual agreements and consortiums between 
the stakeholders of this vital infrastructure, cannot be understated. 
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Figure 3.An end-to-end secure channel for the IoT infrastructure (subject to availability of a unique key within 
each IoT device). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, a security assessment of technologies and standards of theIoT infrastructure were elaborated upon. 
As can be construed, the diversity in the range of devices that constitute an IoT, and the supported protocols, 
encumber the task of securing the end-to-end IoT communication channel. Two paradigms to secure an IoT 
infrastructure, namely, single key-based and two-step based, were proposed. The success of the IoTdepends on 
the close-knit coordination between all stakeholders for agreeing upon a standard approach towards securing the 
entire IoT infrastructure. A large set of diverse and independent security standards will encumber the process of 
securing the IoT infrastructure. It is therefore anticipatedthat a cumulative effort of all stakeholders of an IoT 
infrastructure will produce an effective ground for deployment of secure IoT-based services, to ascertain a 
convenient and safe end-user experience. 
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